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COMMENT
THE LEGALITY OF DRESS CODES FOR STUDENTS, ET. AL.
[N]o scholler doe weare any long lockes of Hayre uppon his
haede, but that be polled, notted, or rounded after the
accustomed manner of the gravest Schollers
of the Universitie.
-Excerpt

from Cambridge University dress code in 15601

Despite the many changes the philosophy and practice of education have
undergone throughout the centuries, at least one element of the learning
process has remained constant-the preoccupation of educators with the
personal appearance of their pupils. Until recent times, the carte blanche
authority of school administrators to prescribe student dress standards was
virtually unchallenged. 2 In 1967 the schoolhouse floodgates collapsed; 3
the courts suddenly became deluged by a rash of cases brought by students
petitioning for review of the legality of their school dress codes.
The facts of these cases are remarkably similar. Fact one:
DRESS CODE

Hair should be neat, clean, and well groomed, and the length should not be over the
eye brows, collar or ears. Sideburns will be permitted to the point where the lower
part of the ear is attached, but must be straight and kept trimmed ....
Beards,
mustaches, and other excessive male styles are disapproved. 4

Fact two: The student's hair fails to conform to the dress code. Fact three:
The student is expelled, suspended, or denied enrollment because of his
infraction of the code, and his refusal thereafter to comply. Given this
very simple fact situation, the courts have been unable to reach a consensus as to the validity of student appearance regulations. Instead, two
divergent trends have emerged, each equally supported by authority, and
1. Wichelns, The Great Hatt and Hayre Controversy, N.E.A.J., May 1968,
at 30.
2. But see Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923), the
precursor of the dress code cases, in which the right of a female student to use
cosmetics was at issue.
3. See infra notes 5 and 6.

4. Wood v. Alamo Heights Independent School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 551, 552

(W.D. Tex. 1970).
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each founded on a myriad of varied rationales. One body of cases has
striken down student dress codes as violative of a student's constitutional
rights; 5 at the same time, an equal number of decisions have upheld
6
dress codes as a valid exercise of authority by school officials.
5. See Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Griffin v. Tatum,
425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970) (dress code was ruled unconstitutional as to "block
type" haircuts, but is otherwise valid); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (Ist
Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 398 U.S. 937
(1970) (the most cited of the anti-dress code cases); Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp.
728 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 318 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.
Tex. 1970); Black v. Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468 (D. Neb. 1970); Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185 (D. N.H. 1970); Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953
(N.D. Ohio 1970) (dress code was upheld, but procedural due process was denied
the student); Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Dunham v. Pulsifer,
312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970) (hair regulations unjustified for male tennis team
members); Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Penn.
1970) (dress code was upheld but plaintiff was not in violation thereof); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970); Cash v. Hoch, 309 F. Supp. 346
(W.D. Wis. 1970); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970); Sims v.
Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970); Calbillo v.
San Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Westley v. Rossi,
305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969); Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist.,
305 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Calif. 1969); Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D.
Ala. 1967). See also Myers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal. App. 2d
549, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969); Laine v. Dittman, 125 Ill. App. 2d 136, 259 N.E.2d
24 (1970).
6. Wood v. Alamo Heights Independent School Dist., 433 F.2d 355 (5th Cir.
1970); Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wheeler County, Ga., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. den., 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.
1970); Davis v. Firment, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969); Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 856
(1968) (the most cited of the cases upholding dress codes); see also Mercer v.
Lothamer, 321 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Gere v. Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852
(M.D. Penn. 1970); Freeman v. Flake, 320 F. Supp. 531 (D. Utah 1970); Bouse
v. Hipes, 319 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School
Dist., 319 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Calf. 1970); Southern v. Bd. of Trustees for the
Dallas Independent School Dist., 318 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Carter v.
Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Whitsell v. Pampa Independent School
Dist., 316 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Bishop v. Colaw, 316 F. Supp. 445
(E.D. Mo. 1970); Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Christmas v. El
Reno Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Okl. 1970) (upholds hair regulations
for graduation exercises); Gfell v. Rickleman, 313 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ohio 1970);
Corley v. Dauhnauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (deals with the right of a
band member to have long hair); Brownlee v. Bradley County, Tennessee Bd. of
Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732
(D. Me. 1970); Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Calf. 1970) (dealt with
the appearance regulations for school athletes); Schwartz v. Galveston Independent
School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Brick v. Bd. of Educ.,
School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 305 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Colo. 1969). See also
Akin v. Bd. of Educ. of Riverside Unified School Dist., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68
Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968); Day v. McDavid, 119 Ill. App. 2d 62, 254 N.E.2d 802
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This comment will examine in detail student dress codes, as well as their
interrelationship with appearance regulations and sactions for Army Reservists, prisoners, public and private employees, lawyers, and ordinary
citizens. Each will be analyzed both from a legal standpoint and in terms
of the common social thread running through them-the human behavioral
tendency which may be called the conformity prejudice.
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

At first glance, the cause of a student who has violated a dress code
by wearing an unauthorized hair style may appear too trivial to merit adjudication in our already overcrowded court system. The issues raised by
this situation, however, are far deeper and more significant than the question of whether a barber's services are warranted. Because a student dress
code establishes a particular style and length of hair as a condition precedent for admission to public school, it may operate to deny a class of citizens a right guaranteed at law-the right to a public education. The existence and application of a dress code thus raises a number of important
constitutional issues not to be taken lightly.
Before these issues are examined in depth, it is necessary to answer the
question: Why do student dress codes exist? Certainly it is apparent to
anyone who recalls his school days with any degree of accuracy that uniformity was the order of the day in the classroom. Rigid rules of discipline
prevailed. Silence was demanded of all students except when called upon
by the teacher; military formations were required before the class could
travel to and from recess; books and pencils were required to be aligned
in a designated manner in one's desk; and the student's clothing was regulated either by requiring a prescribed uniform, as in parochial schools, or
by banning certain taboo apparel, such as blue jeins, T-shirts, or low-cut
dresses.
In the classroom, as well as in all collective experiences-the military 7
and prisons, 8 for example-a high premium is placed on order and control.
Uniformity among students is one means of facilitating efficient and effective order and control. When one must deal with a large mass of persons,
there is simply not sufficient time alloted to treat the individual problems of
each student (or soldier or prisoner) as they arise. Thus, students are
(1970); Leonard v. School Comm. of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468
(1965) (the first of the student dress code cases).
7. See text at note 93, infra.
8. See text at note 99, infra.

COMMENT

1971]

expected to conform to certain uniform behavioral standards, to think, talk,
act, and dress alike, so that law and order may reign in the classroom.
A variety of other justifications are advanced in support of student dress
codes: Students should concentrate upon their studies, not the appearance
of themselves and others. It is disruptive of the learning process to allow
distracting variances in dress.9 The school has the inherent authority to
control student appearance because it acts in loco parentis.10 Dress codes
are necessary to maintain health and safety standards within the school."
The student's academic performance will decline in direct proportion to
his unkempt appearance.' 2 Good grooming is part and parcel of the
total learning experience, instilling in the student the personal pride8 essential so that he may be assimilated into our society as a good citizen.'
Reduced to simplest terms, this means that the student must learn to
think, talk, act, and dress as society expects him to behave-that is, to
conform to its standards. The net result is generally that individuality
is sacrificed for the sake of an authoritarian discipline.
Are student dress codes desirable from a sociological point of view?
There are many, today, who believe that appearance codes (as well as other
student regulations) are not only unnecessary, but also are in fact detrimental to the development of the student qua human being. "[W]hat
grim joyless places most American schools are, how oppresive and petty
the rules by which they are governed, . . .,114 comments Charles Silberman after a three and one half year study of the condition of our educational
system. "These petty rules and regulations are necessary," he reports,
"not simply because of the importance schools attach to control, . . . but
also because schools and school systems operate on the assumption of distrust."' 5 The teacher distrusts the student to the extent that every aspect
of his freedom must be subject to some discretionary constraint-including
his choice of dress. The inevitable result of this distrust pervading the
schoolhouse environment is the "mutilation of a child's spirit."' 6
The fact that dress regulations may be trivial in comparison to other
student problems does not diminish their impact on the student. On the
contrary:
9. See text at note 65, infra.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See
See
See
See

text
text
text
text

at note
at note
at note
at note

73,
71,
83,
82,

inf ra.
infra.
infra.
infra.

SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM

Id. at 133.
Id. at 10.

10 (1970).
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Trivial regulation is more dangerous to one's sense of one's own dignity and to the
belief essential to any democracy that one does have inalienable rights, than gross
regulation is. The real function of petty regulations like these [dress codes] is to
convince youth that it has no rights at all that anybody is obligated to respect, even
17
trivial ones.

No attempt will be made to argue that high school dress codes are the major cause of student unrest, and that the elimination of dress regulations
is the panacea for all educational problems. Suffice it for now to say that
dress codes are a small part of a much larger problem area with which
educators must deal in toto.
Though it is undoubtedly true that a large percentage of teachers support
appearance regulations as a necessary incident of educating, and oppose
any challenge to these regulations as the first step toward the erosion of their
total authority, 18 it is nevertheless not accurate to attribute the existence
of student dress codes solely to teachers. An even greater percentage of
parents, 19 and a surprisingly substantial percentage of students 20 also believe that dress codes are necessary and desireable. This fact bears out the
central thesis of this comment-that the student dress code is not an isolated
phenomenon, but is just one instance of a human behavioral tendency.
The student dress code is merely one manifestation of the overwhelming
power of conformity in twentieth-century America. Deeply imbedded
in our minds is the social need to conform, and to cause others to conform
to arbitrary dress norms. To take the dress code analysis one step further,
17.

Friedenberg, Ceremonies of Humiliation in School, ED. DIG., Nov. 1966, at

35.
18. See, e.g., this contention in Breen v. Kahl, supra note 5, at 1037; Dunham v.
Pulsifer, supra note 5, at 420; Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, supra note 5,
at 862.
19. See Pucker, A Secondary School District Looks at Its Dress Code, 45 J.
SEC. ED. 293 (1970), in which the attitudes of 3,707 students, 347 faculty members,
and 193 parents of the Escondido Union High School District, Escondido, Calf., were
surveyed. The results clearly indicated that the parents tended to be more conservative on the matter of student dress than the faculty. For example, in response
to the question of whether there should be no restrictions on student hair length,
45 percent of the students, 25 percent of the faculty, but only 12 percent of the
parents answered "yes." In response to a regulation prohibiting mustaches on students, 25 percent of the students, 57 percent of the faculty, and 67 percent of the
parents reacted favorably. As to a regulation barring beards on students, 59 percent
of the students, 73 percent of the faculty, and 82 percent of the parents thought it
appropriate.
See also a 1969 Louis Harris poll which revealed that nearly two-thirds of high
school parents believe that "maintaining discipline is more important than student
self-inquiry"; only 27 percent of the teachers agreed. Supra note 14, at 145.
20. See the survey in note 19, supra. See also supra note 14, at 157, for students' tolerant attitude toward school rules.

19711

COMMENT

227

it is, therefore, necessary to explain why conformity is such a dominant
force today.
Dr. Erich Fromm provides a very cogent theory of the causes behind the
conformity phenomenon in our society, premised on the idea that the
most fundamental drive of man is "the need to be related to the world outside oneself, the need to avoid aloneness." ' 21 Medieval man did not confront
the problem of aloneness, as does modem man, because his society was
highly structuralized. He found "relatedness" and avoided aloneness
through the certainty of his role in life, determined for him from the
instant of his birth. Because of the feudal, caste, and guild systems,
there was no hope that he would ever advance another step on the social,
political, or economic ladder. He usually inherited his father's trade and
social status, and accepted his role as an immutable fate. Moreover, the
strong family bonds and religious dogmas reinforced his acceptance of
but he was secure
his role in life. In short, he was without freedom,
22
from the awesome feeling of isolation and alienation.
As history advanced, the medieval institutions began to disintegrate.
The caste and feudal systems yielded to the democratic notions of equality.
Religious taboos faded. Man was somewhat freed from the bondage of
the family. He could no longer automatically identify himself as a member
of a particular class-as an artisan, a knight, or23 a serf; he was now to a
much greater degree the master of his fate in life.
Thus, the result was a new found freedom for man; but a concomitant
of this freedom was the loss of the security and relatedness that attached to
the certainty of a fixed station in life. Man was no longer naturally related to the world through his role in life. Consequently, he became
and anxious as to the uncertainty of who he is and what
insecure, afraid,
24
he is to be.
Dr. Fromm asserts that there are two ways in which modem man may
overcome this feeling of isolation and solve his problem of relatedness to
the world:
By the first course he can progress to "positive freedom"; he can relate himself spon-

taneously to the world in love and work, in the genuine expression of his emotional, sensuous, and intellectual capacities. . . . The other course open to him is
to fall back, to give up freedom, and to try to overcome his aloneness by eliminating
25
the gap that has arisen between his individual self and the world.
21.

FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 34 (1941).

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 69.
at 80.
at 280.
at 161.
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Unfortunately, the second course of action is predominant in our society.
The gap between self and the world is closed through a submission of individual freedom in a number of ways, including conformity. 26 "The person who gives up his individual self and becomes an automaton identical
with millions of other automatons around him, need not feel alone or anxious any more."'27 By conforming to the standards and authority of
others, we find comfort, security, and identity; we overcome the awesome
burden of isolation. The validity of this analysis is borne out by the
tremendous pride with which a person states, "I am an American," "I
am a Republican," "I am a Blackstone Ranger," or "I am a Moose," and
the enormous guilt and insecurity he experiences when he deviates from
the group's norms. The dress code is a by-product of this phenomenon.
Thus far the student dress code has been challenged as pernicious to a
person qua student and human being. At this point, the question arises:
How is this psychological analysis of dress codes relevant to their legality?
Perhaps, there is no relevance. On the other hand, if psychological and
sociological studies indicating that "long hours of labor are dangerous to
women" 2 8 and "[s]egregation

.

.

. in public schools has a detrimental ef-

fect upon colored children" 29 are relevant to assay the constitutionality of
a statute limiting working hours for women and de jure school segregation, respectively, then a factual showing that dress regulations are detrimental to the development of the student may be legally relevant to the
constitutionality of dress codes. Perhaps this is what Judge Wyzanski had
in mind when he stated that "in schools of general comprehensiveness the
constitutional premise is that 'from different tones comes the best tune.' "30
Because some judges are now looking beyond the legal sphere of the controversy and are considering the sociological impact of their decision, such
studies may assume a growing significance in the courtroom.
THE STUDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION

The legal problem posed in a student dress code situation arises from an
attempt by the courts to reconcile two competing interests: (1) the right
of the school administrators, teachers, and public to maintain discipline
26. To keep Fromm's theory in the proper perspective, it should be noted that
conformity is just one mechanism of escape for the isolated and alienated individual; authoritarianism, destructiveness, and submission of individual freedom to
the state are additional mechanisms of escape. Id. at 157-230.
27.

Id. at 209.

28. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419-20 n.1 (1908).
29. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.10 (1954).
30. Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 453 (D. Mass. 1969).
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in the school so as to provide an effective, orderly, and efficient educational process, and (2) the right of an individual student to exercise his
constitutional liberties.
In a situation where a dress code operates to deprive a student of a
constitutionally protected right, he may seek redress in the federal courts.
Jurisdiction may be invoked by the court under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2201, and 2202.31 The initial burden of proof in a
dress code case is on the plaintiff-student to show that the regulation infringes one or more of his contitutional rights. If he can establish this, he
has set up a prima facie case, and the burden shifts to the school district
to prove a "substantial justification" for this infringement. 32 To demonstrate such a justification, "[t]he law must be shown 'necessary and not
merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy.' "-3 Thus, if plaintiff fails to prove a constitutional infirmity in the
dress code, he loses; if he does prove such an infirmity, but the school district establishes a substantial justification, he still loses. The student will
prevail only if there is both a constitutional infringement and a want of
substantial justification. The following are some of the contitutional arguments that could be presented in opposition to student dress codes.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

The leading case in the area of a student's right of free speech and ex34
pression is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.
Tinker had been sent home from school for wearing a black armband in
protest of the Vietnam War. The Supreme Court construed the wearing of
the armband as "involving direct primary First Amendment rights 'akin
to pure speech.' 35 In upholding Tinker's right to wear the symbol of
dissent in school, Justice Fortas declared: "It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights of freedom or
36
expression at the schoolhouse gate."1
There are three substantial limitations to this symbolic speech approach that circumscribe its application in dress code litigation. The first
is an inherent limitation the Tinker Court itself placed on its holding:
31. See, e.g., Freeman v. Flake, supra note 6, at 533; Livingston v. Swanquist,
supra note 6, at 2.
32. See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, supra note 5, at 1036; Crews v. Cloncs, supra note
5, at 1264; Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School Dist., supra note 6, at 372.
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
34. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
35. Id. at 508.
36. Id. at 506.
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"The problem posed by the present case does not relate to the regulation
of the length of skirts, or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment."'3 7 The second is that the student himself usually does not intend
to convey an idea by his appearance; he is wearing long hair simply
38
because he likes it and not as an advocacy of any political opinion.
Since he has no intent to communicate an idea through his conduct, but
merely to express his personality, he is without the free speech immunity
of the first amendment. However, even if the student intends his dress to
symbolize an idea, there still is a third obstacle that the courts have encountered-distinguishing between conduct that is akin to pure speech and
that which is purely meaningless. The courts are clearly troubled as to what
conduct constitutes symbolic speech. The Supreme Court has recently
stated: "We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety
of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends to thereby express an idea."' 39 Where then should the
line be drawn? May a student's hair effectively symbolize, within the first
amendment protection, his opposition to the selective service system?
Similarly, then, may long finger nails express opposition to the admission
of Red China to the United Nations?
The courts have been much more receptive to the symbolic speech argument when the object of expression is something other than hair or
40
ordinary wearing apparel-for example, armbands, buttons, or berets.
These are objects which through custom and usage have become symbolic
signs of dissent. But even these modes of dissent are fraught with legal
difficulties. If a nuclear disarmament sign is permitted as symbolic free
speech, what about a swastika? And what if a student wearing a "racial
unity" button causes violent distburbances in a racially-mixed high
school? 41
37. Id. at 507.
38. An analysis of the dress code cases reveals that almost without exception the
plaintiff-student wore long hair because it "looks better" (Crews v. Cloncs, supra
note 5, at 1259), because it expresses his "personality" (Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified
School Dist., supra note 6, at 371), because it expresses his "individuality"
(Brick v. Bd. of Educ., School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, supra note 6, at
1319), or other such similar non-political reasons; but see Corley v. Dauhnauer,
supra note 6, at 812-13.
39. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
40. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., supra note
34 (armband); Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.
1971) (armbands); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (button); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (buttons);
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (buttons); Hernandez v. School
Dist. Number One, Denver, Colo., 315 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970) (berets).
41. For treatment of this factual setting, see Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd.
of Educ., supra note 40.
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One thing is clear: "[T]he less speech element and the more conduct
element, the lessor protection the First Amendment gives."' 42 Thus, a hair
style which is almost devoid of expression on the speech-conduct continuum, does not usually fall within the protective umbrella of the first
amendment. Buttons and armbands, however, which contain a greater
measure of the "speech element" tend to be afforded the first amendment
protection by the courts.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION

In order for a denial of the equal protection of the law to exist, "[t]here
must be a classification which is the creature of some state action, and the
classification must be unjustified under the applicable standards of review."'43 There are two situations under which dress codes may cause a
denial of equal protection to the student, and both are illustrated in
Miller v. Gillis.44 Plaintiff Miller, a student in an Illinois secondary school,
was denied enrollment because of his shoulder length hair. Testimony
revealed that at the same time there were a number of male teachers at
the same school, wearing long hair with impunity. The court invalidated
the regulation because it is arbitraryin two ways: First, it is "arbitrary in
that the regulation makes the acquisition of all education depend upon the
length of one's hair."'4 5 Such a classification is unjustified. Second,
long-haired males, amongst themselves, are denied the equal protection
of the law because the regulation is enforced only as to certain long hairs,that is, students and not teachers. Nevertheless, a substantial number of
cases 46 have found dress codes not to be arbitrary and unjustified classifications, for a variety of reasons. 47
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

A student expelled for an alleged dress code infraction may complain
if his expulsion is carried out in an improper manner. While there are
no settled principles on what constitutes academic due process rights, it
appears certain that a modicum of procedural safeguards are guaranteed
42.
43.

Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School Dist., supra note 6, at 372.
Dunham v. Pulsifer, supra note 5, at 414-15.

44.

Supra note 5.

45.

Miller v. Gillis, supra note 5, at 101.

46. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ., Wheeler County, Ga., supra note 6, at
1158; Southern v. Bd. of Trustees for the Dallas Independent School Dist., supra

note 6, at 359; Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School Dist., supra note 6,
at 579; Gfell v. Rickleman, supra note 6, at 365.

47.

For these reasons, see text at notes 65 et seq.
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to the student. 4s First, there must be written notice to the student of exactly what conduct (dress) is expected of him. Usually, this requirement
is satisfied by a promulgated school regulation. If, however, no dress code

is published, and enforcement of student appearance depends entirely
on the subjective and arbitrary fiat of the school administrators, the notice
requirement is not met, and due process is denied the student.4 9 Similarly,
if there is a written regulation, but it is "unduly vague, uncertain, and
ambiguous" there is probably not adequate notice to the student.5 0 Second,
an adversary hearing prior to imposition of any penalty may be required,
depending on the patentness of the violation."' Third, procedural due
process is denied when punishment is not meted out in accordance with
fixed practices and regulations-for example, when a student is suspended
by a principal who lacks the statutory authority to suspend dress code
violators. 2 Fourth, a student may not be disciplined unless he is in violation of the regulation in fact. Thus, in Lovelace v. Leechburg Area
School Dist.,53 the court found that an eighteen year old student, who had
never shaved, was denied due process because his thin, wispy, natural
5 4
growth on his lip was not in fact a dress code violation.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The leading case in the area of "right of privacy" is Griswold v. Connecticut5" in which the Supreme Court by a 7-2 margin invalidated a statute
48. For a discussion of academic due process guidelines, see Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961).
49. See generally Richards v. Thurston, supra note 5, in which there was no
officially promulgated dress code, but only the principal's personal taste; contra,
Hasson v. Boothby, 318 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Mass. 1970).
50. See Crossen v. Fatsi, supra note 5, at 115; but see Giangreco v. Center
School Dist., supra note 6, in which the following dress code was in controversy:
"Extreme hair styles should be avoided. The hair should be kept neatly combed,
brushed and trimmed, and of a length and style that will not interfere with normal
school routine." Id. at 778. The court stated: "The specificity required of criminal statutes is not required in the field of education ......
Id. at 781.
51. See Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School Dist., supra note 6, at 370. The
court decided that a prior hearing was not necessary because the plaintiffs' violation
of the dress code was "obvious." See also Jackson v. Dorrier, supra note 6, at 217 in
which the court decided that a hearing was not an essential prerequisite to suspension, because the plaintiffs were given ample opportunity to be heard; see for a
further discussion of a student's right to a hearing, Davis v. Ann Arbor Public
Schools, 313 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. Mich. 1970) and Vought v. Van Buren Public
Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
52. See Cordova v. Chonko, supra note 5, at 962.
53. 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Penn. 1970).
54. But see Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ. for Wheeler County, Ga., supra note 6,
at 1156.
55. Supra note 33.
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prohibiting the use of contraceptives as an unconstitutional invasion of
the privacy of married persons. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority,
reasoned:
[Slpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. .
tees create zones of privacy. 56

.

. Various guaran-

The relevant question then is: Does a person's right to choose his dress
and hair style lie within the zone of privacy created by the Bill of Rights?
The courts have usually answered in the negative, eschewing a determination of what falls within the ambit of Griswold. To fit within the right of
privacy, "there must be some specific provision or provisions of the Bill of
Rights from which [the student's] . . . right of grooming emanates.

'57

It may be contended that the student's right to choose his appearance is
within the penumbral zones of the first amendment (free speech and ex-

pression), fourth amendment (no unreasonable searches or seizures), and
ninth amendment (rights retained by people). Judge Kerner apparently
58
accepted this viewpoint in Breen v. Kahl:
The right to wear one's hair at any length or in any desired manner is an ingredient
of personal freedom protected by the United States Constitution. . . . Whether this
right is designated as within the "penumbras" of the first amendment freedom of
speech . . . or as encompassed within the ninth amendment as . . . "additional fundamental right[s] * * * which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments . . . , it clearly exists and
is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Not wishing to skate on the thin ice of Griswold, most courts, however,
have dodged any analysis of this issue, either by holding the right of
privacy argument invalid or by disregarding it and finding for the plaintiff
on "safer" grounds. 59
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT

The ninth amendment of the Constitution, was written in response to the
fear that an enumeration of the rights of citizens would result in an abdication of the rights that remained unenumerated. 60 The question of what
56.
57.
58.
59.

Supra note 33, at 484.
Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524, 529 (E.D. La. 1967).
Supra note 5, at 1036.
See, e.g., Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94, 100 (N.D. Ill. 1969).

60.

See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Gale & Seaton ed. 1834), where James Madi-

son said: "It has been objected also against a bill of rights that by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which
were not placed on that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of
the General Government."
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rights comprise these unenumerated rights of the ninth amendment has
been almost completely ignored by the courts. In examining the problem
in Griswold, Justice Goldberg, concurring, declared that the marital privacy of husband and wife is one such unenumerated right. To fit within
the ninth amendment, a right must be "fundamental" and in the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people."6 1
Using this approach, the right to the personal appearance of one's choosing may be so fundamental as to fall under the ninth amendment's protection. The founding fathers of our nation were certainly "long hairs" by
contemporary standards, as were a multitude of other great Americans.
Certainly, the authors of the Contitution, flamboyant as they were, regarded personal appearance as a matter of right. One could imagine the
public outcry had the First Congress passed a law requiring crewcut
hair styles and declaring wigs illegal. Continual change in clothing fashion
and hair style is so deeply rooted in the American tradition that there is
no valid reason that the freedom of personal appearanceshould not be held
an unenumerated right retained by the people.
FREEDOM TO WORK WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE

In Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist.,6 2 three students, members of a musical group, "Sounds Unlimited," were denied enrollment in
their high school because of their long hair. They argued, inter alia, that
the state's interfernce with their right to work is an abridgement of their
constitutional rights. They reasoned that because in their profession it is
necessary to have long hair to attract an audience, the dress code is a violation of the liberty and property concepts of the fifth amendment. The
court summarily rejected this assertion, in effect telling the plaintiffs
that wigs were available for working hours.
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS

There are undoubtedly many other valid constitutional arguments for
striking down dress codes. Under the particular facts and circumstances
of a case, innovative thought may provide a viable ground for relief. For
example, if a black student is in violation of a hair regulation because of
his Afro-style haircut, there may exist a case of racial discrimination, because the hair of Negroes is of a different texture than Caucasions or because the regulation deprives him of his African culture. If a student's
hair or beard is worn because of his membership in a particular cult or
61.

Supra note 33, at 487.

62.

392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
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church, the first amendment religious immunity may be applicable. If
a student, because of his family's financial condition, lacks the funds to
purchase the clothing necessary to comply with his school's dress code,
there may be unjustified discrimination against indigents. And, perhaps,
the dress code is an unwarranted discrimination as to sex. (Why allow
girls to wear long hair, and limit the length of boy's hair?) It has even
that requiring a haircut is
been urged, although totally unsuccessfully,
"cruel and unusual punishment."' 63
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT'S BURDEN OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION

If the student has borne his burden of proving an encroachment by
the dress code on one or more of his constitutional rights, the attention of
the case is shifted to the school district to prove a substantial justification
for the regulation. 64 A myriad of arguments have been advanced relating
the dress code to the successful operation of the school, or asserting that
the court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. Some of the dominant
themes throughout the cases are:
DISRUPTION, DISTRACTION, AND DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS

The Tinker case specifically provided that conduct "which materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 6 5 Thus, if a particular style of dress or hair
is disruptive to others, it may be proscribed by a dress code. This is by
far the most common justification by school officials in support of dress
codes. 66
To invoke this defense, a nexus must be established between a student's unauthorized appearance (long hair) and disruption. As proof
thereof the school districts have proffered opinion testimony of school
officials, opinion testimony of expert witnesses, evidence of disturbances
of which plaintiff was the cause, evidence of similar disturbances in other
schools, and findings of fact in other cases. Logically, a male student with
long hair may be linked with disruptiveness only if it is true that: (1)
long hair causes a male student to have a greater tendency to misbehave
and provoke other students to violent conduct, or (2) other students,
63.

Supra note 57, at 529.

64.

See supra note 32.

65. Supra note 34, at 513.
66. This argument is presented in almost every case; see, e.g., cases in notes 5
and 6, supra.

236

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XX

without provocation, tend to react to a male with long hair in a violent or
abusive manner. Either way, an affirmative, objective showing of disruption is required, for "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 6distur7
bance is not enough to overcome the right of freedom of expression.
To prove the first proposition, the school district must establish that long
hair is in fact the proximate cause of a student's disorderliness. A variety
of syllogisms have been presented to meet this end. For example:
Seventy percent of discipline problems in our school are "exponents or practitioners
of lengthy hair grooming for males." Only thirty percent of troublemakers are shorthairs. Ergo, long hair causes discipline problems.6 8
Last year the dress code was enforced, and order was maintained in the school. This
year the dress code is not enforced, and there is a substantial increase in discipline
problems, e.g., firecrackers in lockers, jostling in the halls, etc. Ergo, nonconforming dress must be the cause.6 9

This reasoning is no more than a post hoc ergo propter hoc approach, with
no basis in fact. To say that long hair causes discipline problems is to
transpose the cause for the effect. If there is in reality a rational connection between the two, the casual relationship is just the opposite-that is,
a disorderly student may choose long hair as a badge of his rebellion.
The hair does not cause the rebelliousness; the rebelliousness causes the
hair. To require a haircut, therefore, eliminates the effect but not the
cause. The student's hostile attitude remains beneath the roots of his hair,
and in all probability is only worsened by the school authorities' demanding of his scalp.
The second means of proving long hair equals disruption is to establish

that other students react violently to a male student with long hair. This
proposition is very easy to prove, because it is undoubtedly correct. Human

beings do tend to react with hostility to persons different from them,
whether the difference is race, religion, ethnic background, political belief,

or appearance. However, to bar a long-haired student from school simply
because his outward appearance incites anger in others is to penalize an
innocent person. He is not the cause of the disturbance; those who harass
and assault him are the true provocateurs. A man may not be restrained
"from doing a lawful act merely because he knows it will cause another
67. Supra note 34, at 508.
68. Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570, 579
(S.D. Tex. 1970).
69. Whitsell v. Pampa Independent School Dist., 316 F. Supp. 852, 853 (N.D.
Tex. 1970). This reasoning, carried ad absurdum, is best illustrated by the joke
about the Manhattan resident who compulsively snapped his fingers. When asked
by a friend why he did it, he answered, "To keep tigers away from my window."
"But there isn't a tiger within ten-thousand miles of here!" his friend protested.
"See how well it works," he replied.
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to do an unlawful act." 70 If a particular dress style is illegal merely because it may cause another to pummel the plaintiff, then perhaps it is illegal for a black man to move into an all-white suburb because of the disruptions sure to follow. And why then is it not illegal to speak against
the President's war policies when it is certain to disrupt "Middle America."
The natural implication of any extension of this doctrine would be an
obliteration of the Bill of Rights.
HEALTH AND SAFETY

Another common justification for dress codes is that they are essential
to prevent student health and safety problems, which may be caused by
long hair on males. 7 1 For example, long hair may become caught in a
lathe in an industrial arts class; it may lead to injury in a wrestling
class; it may clog the swimming pool drain; if unwashed, it may become
infested with fleas.
Undoubtedly, this justification has some validity. Hair which extends
beyond a student's shoulder in a shop class, constitutes as grave a safety
hazard as loose-fitting clothing and ties, which, traditionally are prohibited
from such classes. However, this fact should not be used as an excuse for
permitting overly broad appearance regulations. The maintenance of student safety may necessitate forbidding students to wear shoulder length
hair in shop courses, but when dealing with sideburns, mustaches, and
hair which covers the ear, safety is no longer a factor. Moreover, safety
may often be attained without a broad general proscription of excessive
hair length; narrower regulations, such as those requiring protective
caps in shop and athletic classes, may often suffice.
The argument that long hair on male students is a health problem is
utterly fallacious. Why is not long hair on female students also a health
problem? The "lengthiness" of the hair does not cause the problem; it is
the lack of good gromming habits, such as washing and combing the hair,
that causes any health problem. Since there is "no rational basis for distinction between males and females," 72 a code which regulates hair length
70. Richards v. Thurston, supra note 30, at 454; Beatty v. Gillbanks, 9 Q.B.D.
308, 314 (1882); see also, United States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan,
Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897, 906 (M.D. Ala. 1961), where the court said: "[Tihe threat
of mob violence is no excuse for the failure of the Court to issue an injunction to
protect the constitutional rights of private citizens."
71. See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 316 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Gfell
v. Rickleman, 313 F. Supp. 364, 366 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F.

Supp. 706, 711-12 (D. Minn. 1969).
72. Cash v. Hoch, 309 F. Supp. 346, 348 (W.D. Wis. 1970); see Crews v.
Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970).
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for males, resting entirely upon health considerations, creates an arbitrary
classification in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
IN LOCO PARENTIS

In Breen v. Kahli" the school district sought to justify its dress code by
the argument that it stood in the place of the student's parents, and, thus,
had the right to discipline the student irrespective of any rational basis
for the regulation. The court discounted the validity of this contention, especially in view of the parents' support of their son's choice of hair style.
A historical analysis of the doctrine of in loco parentis reveals that it
"was never a control device to govern the child's conduct in areas where
the parents could disagree with the school or which was outside the educational province."'7 4 Today, the last vestiges of this doctrine survive only as
"a shibboleth no longer acceptable as a basis to justify student regulations."75
OPEN THE FLOODGATES

Also argued in the Breen case was the familiar warning that to allow
the student his day in court would open the floodgates of litigation. 76 The
court summarily rejected this defense, because to sustain it would require
the court to abdicate its role as arbiter of the rights of all citizens, young
and old.
CODE AUTHORED BY STUDENTS

In many cases, the dress code is composed, published, and promulgated
by the student council. From this fact comes the argument that the students bound themselves to a course of conduct through their own volition.
Although this argument is never used alone as a justification, it can give
added weight to another justification. For instance, in Glell v. Rickelman77 the court concluded that the fact that the code originated with the
73.

419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).

74. Schwartz, 1969: The Year of the Long Hair or How "In Loco Parentis" Bit
the Dust, 58 ILL. B.J. 904, 910 (1970); see Karr v. Schmidt, supra note 5, at 734
n.10.

75. Id. at 910.
76. Supra note 73, at 1038.
77.

Supra note 71, at 366; but see

supra note 14, at 155-57, for a

SILBERMAN,

discussion of student government: "[M]ost students are not alienated and do not
want power because they feel they would not know what to do with it if they had it.
They have remarkable faith in the high schools' paternalism and so see no need to
question what their teachers are doing or why. .

.

. As a result, schools are able

to manipulate students into doing much of the dirty work under the guise of selfgovernment." Id. at 155-56.
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students "dispels any contention of arbitrariness or capriciousness." However, this is a specious argument because the student himself did not participate in the writing of the dress code. And even if plaintiff did himself
write the code, it cannot stand if it is in law unconstitutional.
AESTHETIC CONSIDERATIONS

Only one case, Brownlee v. Bradley County, Tennessee Bd. of Educ.78
has relied on aesthetics as a justification for a dress code:
A sense of orderliness, a sense of propriety, and a sense of beauty are distinguishing
characteristics of the human species. While not always explainable in terms of conlife. They form the basis of the concrete reason, these matters are facts of human
79
cept commonly referred to as aesthetics.

Recognizing the "fact" that long hair on males is contrary to tradition, and
offensive to many people, the court upheld the validity of the dress code.
The court, also, relied heavily on the point that the students, themselves,
had made the aesthetic judgment through the student council's adoption of
the dress code. The court concluded that such judgment was "neither
arbitrary, nor capricious, nor was devoid of reason."
If there is reason behind the student's aesthetic judgment, it was merely
subjective reason. Because aesthetics necessarily involves taste and fancy
of the individual mind, it is unavoidably subjective. There is grave danger
in allowing subjective opinion to govern and control our constitutional
rights. At the very heart of our legal system is the concept of an objective
standard so that all citizens may be afforded the equal protection of the
law. To rely upon subjective aesthetic considerations would appear to endanger this principle. The sole authority upon which the court relied for a
classificaton based on aesthetic factors is an eminent domain case.80
Thus, the court's reasoning tends to smack of the morally offensive notion
that minors are to be regulated as property rather than persons.
GOOD GROOMING

School officials frequently maintain that dress regulation is necessary
because the teaching of good grooming per se is a proper educational
function. 81 As additional support, arguments are sometimes advanced
relating the teaching of good grooming habits to the development of good
78. 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
79. Id. at 1366.
80. Berman v. Parker, 384 U.S. 26 (1954).
81. See, e.g., Gfell v. Rickleman, supra note 71, at 366; Schwartz v. Galveston
Independent School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
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citizenship. 8 2 There may well be a correlation between sloppy or dirty
appearance and poor citizenship. Undoubtedly, a school may promote
good gromming habits by requiring a student's body and clothing to be
clean. However, good grooming may not justify hair regulation for males,
unless it may be assumed either that long hair causes poor citizenship or
that long hair departs from good grooming norms. In view of the hair
length of our founding fathers, the statement that long hair causes poor citizenship is untenable. Moreover, there is no rational basis for holding that
the long hair of either males or females, which is clean and neatly combed,
does not comport with established principles of good grooming.
DECLINE OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE

In a number of cases, the school district has contended that "[s]tudents whose appearances conform to the dress regulation perform better
in school."88 No factual foundation for this assertion has ever been
produced. In the absence of proof of a direct relationship between dress
and performance, scholastic or athletic, this conjectural statement cannot
substantially justify dress codes. Even in the case of a student whose
grades have fallen simultaneously with the growth of his hair, there exists
no positive evidence that one has caused the other. Perhaps, a third factor, e.g., a domestic problem, has caused both. Only via the faulty
reasoning process of a post hoc ergo propter hoc approach, may a connection between low grades and long hair be established.
JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS

Jurisdiction may not be invoked under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in dress code
situations, unless there is "state action" involved. Usually, the requisite
state action cannot be found in the case of a private school. In Bright v.
Isenbarger,8" for example, the plaintiff-students alleged that there was sufficient state action in their private school to grant relief under section
1983. The court rejected this contention even though the state certified
the school, required that certain subjects be taught, granted the school a
property tax exemption, and provided free bussing for some of its students.
Mere state involvement with the school is not enough to constitute state
action; the activity of the state must be directly related to the injury
82. See, e.g., Simms v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485, 488
(S.D. Iowa 1970).
83. Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248, 253 (D. Neb. 1970); see also
Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970), involving the athletic performance of a tennis player with long hair.
84. 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
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caused to plaintiff.8 5 Since the state did not set appearance guidelines,
the court concluded: "Private schools may impose disciplined conformity
of dress, speech, and action, such as found in military schools and to a
lesser extent in most private schools, which public schools may not." 86
However, in the case of a military academy receiving tuition payments
from the state for the education of certain students, an action under section
8 7
1983, challenging the dress code is maintainable.
Even when dealing with public schools, a small minority of courts have
refused to rule on the merits of the case, holding that abstention is appropriate, or requiring exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to a
section 1983 action.88 These decisions are contrary to the vast weight
of authority on section 1983 jurisdiction. 9
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Dress codes have been upheld for a variety of other reasons. For example, in Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist.90 the court reasoned
that hair regulations are justified because to allow students to grow mustaches might cause feelings of inadequacy or insecurity in those who are incapable of doing so. In Farrell v. Smith9 1 the court, in examining economic
factors, upheld the dress code for a vocational school, because it "enhances the image of the school and its students among prospective employers, and thereby furthers the employment opportunities of the students upon graduation." And the petition of a bearded student who had
been denied admission in a public college was dismissed in King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist.,92 because a preliminary injuction was not necessary to preserve the status quo. (The refusal of the school officials to
enroll plaintiff was the status quo.)
ARMY RESERVISTS AND NATIONAL GUARDSMEN

To anyone who has experienced a military existence for any duration, it
85. Id. at 1394.
86. Id. at 1392.
87. Doe v. Hackler, 316 F. Supp. 1144 (D. N.H. 1970).
88. See Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (abstention); Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Mo. 1969)
(exhaustion of remedies); Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School Dist., 309 F.
Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (exhaustion of remedies or, in the alternative, abstention).
89. See, e.g., Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706, 712 (D. Minn. 1969).
90. 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Penn. 1970).
91.
92.

310 F. Supp. 732 (D. Me. 1970).
425 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XX

is common knowledge that few things will inspire the wrath of a superior
officer more than a soldier who is "out of uniform." Aside from prisoners,
there is probably no other human occupation for which dress and appearance are so highly regimented-and understandably so. In view of
the hundred of thousands of men who enter and leave active duty each
year, there is little room for any deviation from the norm; the very nature of the military demands absolute standardization-one uniform for
all. Apart from the financial impracticality of tailoring the military costume to the taste of each individual soldier, there are far deeper reasons why the military has not tolerated variances in appearance. First,
of course, is the deeply-rooted tradition of the uniformed fighting man.
Second, there is the psychological motive: to deprive the soldier of any
means of asserting his individuality, so that he becomes a team player, a
fighting machine that reacts unquestioningly and automatically to the
needs of his fellow troops. Third, any variance in appearance may interfere with his combat efficiency. For example, long hair may cause the
soldier's head gear to fit improperly; a single strand of long hair which
falls in the firing chamber may cause his weapon to misfire; a beard or
sideburns may interfere with his wearing a protective (gas) mask. In
addition to these reasons, there is a fourth, generally unstated, reason that
the military refuses to yield to changes in male hair styles. Many of those
men who choose to wear lengthy hair are outspoken critics of the military
and the military-industrial complex. In the context of our times, long hair
on males has in fact become a symbol of dissent. It is no wonder, therefore, that the pentagon, fearing that dissent will spread across the ranks
of the armed forces, opposes this badge of protest.
For the soldier on active duty, these reasons provide sufficient justification for a rigid military dress code. However, in the case of an Army
Reservist, who spends only one weekend a month on duty, and the remainder of the time as a civilian, the military dress code as it relates
Is
to hair, sideburns, and mustaches may be seriously questioned.
the interest of the military in the semi-soldier/pseudo-civilian's hair length
for one weekend per month, sufficient to warrant regulations affecting his
appearance in his non-military existence for the remainder of the month?
Before this question may be answered, it is necessary to explain the
military obligation of a reservist. After a reservist completes his initial
active duty training (four to six months), he is obligated to attend monthly
93
drills in a ready reserve unit for six years from the date of his induction.
A failure to have sideburns, mustache, or hair in conformity with Army
93.

10 U.S.C.A. § 511 (Supp. 1970).
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Regulations results in an unsatisfactory drill. 94 If in any period of a year,
the reservist accumulates five unsatisfactory and unexcused drills, he
may be ordered to active duty for two years less any active duty time already served. 95 Thus, the reservist's problem is quite the opposite of the
student's plight. The student's long hair causes him to be thrown out of
school, whereas the reservist's long hair cause him to be thrown into the
Army.
Obedience to the military dress code can cause more dire consequences
for the reservist than a school dress code causes a student. Usually, a
reservist is at that stage in life at which he must support himself, and
perhaps a wife and children. If he is a musician, entertainer, actor, or
seller of men's fashions his military appearance may impair his success at
his livelihood. In most cases, long hair would not hinder his performance
as a soldier on weekend drills. Why, then, is a military haircut required?
One might suspect that the military's distaste for "hippie-types" is the controlling factor.
The military dress code has been judicially challenged on a number of
occasions, and each time has been upheld. 96 Although constitutional parallels between the situations of the reservist and the student can be drawn,
the courts have generally refused to reach the constitutional issues presented. The evolving rule of law is that the courts will not rule on the
legality of military appearance regulations or sanctions for violations
thereof, because "it is not our function to review the discretionary judgment of a military officer made within the scope of his authority. ' 97 In
the case of Smith v. Resor,9 8 however, the court ordered the Army to stay
reservist Smith's call-up order, because his commanding officer failed to follow Army Regulations in directing him to report to active duty. Thus, it
appears that a denial of procedural due process is the only ground on
which a court will grant relief to a reservist.
94. See A.R. 600-20 governing appearance of Army personnel, and A.R. 135-91
(5) concerning unsatisfactory performance by a reservist.
95. 10 U.S.C.A. § 673a (Supp. 1970).
96. See Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (1971); Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d
908 (2d Cir. 1970) in which a shoe salesman was ordered to active duty because of
unsatisfactory drills; Byrne v. Resor, 412 F.2d 774 (3rd Cir. 1969), in which a failure
to wear a military belt resulted in the fifth unsatisfactory drill; Raderman v. Kaine,
411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969), in which long hair on an agent for a musical group
caused his call-up; Krill v. Bauer, 314 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wis. 1970), in which the
court dismissed the petition of a number of reservists, asking that enforcement of the
Army hair regulation be enjoined as unconstitutional. See also Doyle v. Koelbl, 434
F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the court rejected the challenge of a member of
the Air Force on active duty to the hair regulation.
97. Byrne v. Resor, supra note 96, at 775.
98. 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XX

PRISONERS

Although it is doubtlessly true that upon lawful incarceration a prisoner
loses many of the rights and privileges he would otherwise be able to exercise, it would nevertheless be incorrect to state that he has surrendered
all of his constitutional liberties. What rights are withdrawn and what rights
are retained? Three recent cases have focused on this question as it relates to appearance regulations for inmates of penal institutions. In
Brown v. Wainwright,9 9 a Florida prisoner alleged that "he is a demigod, 'an offspring of a God and Mortal,' and that his mustache is a gift
from his creator." Another Florida prisoner, in Brooks v. Wainwright,0 0
took a similar approach, alleging that he had received a "divine revelation"
from the "Lord God of Israel" commanding him to follow "His laws such
as given Moses for the children of Israel." Among these laws in Biblical
scripture is: "Ye shall not round the corner of your head, neither shalt
thou mar the corner of thy beard."' 10 1 Both men contended that the
prison hair and shaving regulations conflict with their first amendment
right to freely exercise their religious beliefs. In Blake v. Pryse,'0 2
a federal prisoner took a different approach, asserting that shaving is unconstitutional as corporeal punishment. The courts ruled against the prisoners in each of the cases, failing to find either "cruel or inhumane punishment" or an infringement of the freedom of religion. Among the justifications cited by the courts in support of prison appearance sanctions are:
Hair and shaving regulations are necessary to promote hygiene and cleanliness for prisoners. 10 3 Weapons might conceivably be concealed in
the long hair of an inmate. 10 4 Unusual hairstyles might be offensive to
other prisoners.' 0 5 Finally, regulations relating to length and growth of
facial hair are necessary for easy identification of the prisoner from prison
photographs.' 0 6 Though from a legal standpoint, these reasons substantially justify penal hair regulations, there remains the question of whether
it is, in view of modem theories of criminal rehabilitation, desireable to
quash one of the few means available for a prisoner to express his individuality (i.e., through his facial appearance).
99.

419 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970).

See Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523

(C.D. Cal. 1971) in which another prisoner lost on identical grounds.
100. 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970).
101. Leviticus 19:27; Numbers 6:5.
102. 315 F. Supp. 625 (D. Minn. 1970).
103. Supra note 99, at 1377; supra note 100, at 653.
104. Supra note 102, at 626.
105. Supra note 102, at 626.
106. Supra note 99, at 1377; supra note 100, at 653; supra note 102, at 626.
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PRIVATE EMPLOYEES

The adjudication of the rights of a private employee who has violated
a company appearance regulation differs significantly from all other
dress code situations. Here the controversy does not involve the rights of
an individual vis-a-vis some governmental authority, but rather the private
rights of two private parties, employer and employee. It does not arise
out of the Constitution and laws of our land, but rather from a privately
negotiated collective bargaining agreement. Employee due process is not
determined by settled judicial principles, but rather within the framework
of a negotiated grievance procedure. The employee's tribunal is not
headed by a judge, but a labor arbitrator. And stare decisis does not apply. Yet, despite these striking differences, the considerations to be made
are essentially the same as in all dress code cases. 0 7
If the specifics of the company dress code are embodied in the collective
bargaining agreement, an employee is without legal ground to complain
of its enforcement. In accordance with basic contract law principles, he is
legally bound to render performance on his promise to dress as the contract dictates. This, however, is not the case, for the company dress code
is never expressly included in the labor contract. Instead, management
derives its general authority to prescribe employee appearance standards
from some broad provision in the contract, pertaining to the employer's
right to control dress, 10 8 to manage his business, 10 9 or to make reasonable
rules and regulations. 1 0 Labor arbitrators have upheld this managerial
right to control employee dress subject to one important limitation: reasonableness."' If a dress regulation is reasonable, discharge for a violation thereof is for good cause.
Reasonableness can be determined in each particular case only by
weighing the conflicting interests of the respective parties, which in essence is the approach of the student dress code courts. (Does the school's
right to maintain discipline substantially justify [outweigh] the student's
107.
(1969)

See, e.g., Teamsters Local 396 v. United Parcel Service, 53 Lab. Arb. 126
(Kotin, Arbitrator), for a discussion of specificity required of employee

rules; compare note 50.

108. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 396 v. United Parcel Service, supra note 107.
109. See, e.g., Retail Clerks Local 919 v. Stop and Shop Inc., 49 Lab. Arb. 867,
868 (1967) (Johnson, Arbitrator).
110. See, e.g., Brewery Workers Local 20 v. Pepsi Cola General Bottlers, Inc.,
55 Lab. Arb. 663, 664 (1970) (Volz, Arbitrator).
111. See, e.g., supra note 109, at 666; Operating Engineers Local 66 v. DravoDoyle Company, 54 Lab. Arb. 604, 605 (1970) (Krimsly, Arbitrator); Rubber
Workers Local 662 v. Springday Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 627, 628 (1969) (Bothwell,
Arbitrator).
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right to wear long hair?) An employee's right of personal appearance
may be outweighed by any one of the three interests of the employer:
(1) maintaining employee safety; (2) guaranteeing sanitary production
methods; or (3) upholding the company's good image with the public.
The first factor, employee safety, parallels similar student and reservist
justifications. Although an employer has the undisputed right to require
protective gear (e.g., hard hats for construction workers, protective shields
for welders), his authority to control hair length terminates when a rule departs from the realm of safety and becomes nothing more than an expression of his personal prejudices and preferences. The fact that long
hair on machine operators-male or female-has long been considered
a safety hazard imparts the requisite reasonableness to hair regulation. 112
However, under the particular facts and circumstances of a case, sound
safety practices may not require short hair for operators of certain machines. I3
The second factor, sanitariness, comes into play when the production of
food is involved. Hats and hairnets are usually required to prevent hair
from falling into the food. Because sideburns and beards cannot be
covered, regulations proscribing them have been held reasonable to pre4
vent hair contamination of the food.'
The third factor, the company's image, is founded on the premise that
long hair, beards, and sideburns on employees elicits the disfavor of customers and impairs the earning potential of the company. Because of the
possible danger to a company's image, labor arbitrators have affirmed the
discharge or suspension of a supermarket stock clerk with long hair, 1 5
a hotel engineer with long sideburns, 116 an airline ramp agent with long
hair," 17 a gas company service clerk with a beard," l8 and a route salesman with long hair, sideburns, and a mustache. 1 9 On the other hand,
112.

See Rubber Workers Local 662 v. Springday Co., supra note 111.

113. See Steel Workers Local 2018 v. Challenge-Cook Brothers Inc., 55 Lab.
Arb. 517 (1970) (Robert, Arbitrator).

114. See Grain Millers Local 252 v. Kellogg Co., 55 Lab. Arb. 84 (1970)
(Shearer, Arbitrator); contra, Meat Cutters Local 612 v. Economy Super Mart, 54
Lab. Arb. 816 (1970) (Elson, Arbitrator).
115. Retail Clerks Local 1105 v. Allied Employers Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 1020
(1970) (Kleinsorge, Arbitrator).
116. Operating Engineers Local 501 v. Hotel Employers Council of Los
Angeles, 55 Lab. Arb. 531 (1970) (Neblett, Arbitrator).
117. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Western Air Line Inc., 52 Lab. Arb.
1282 (1969).
118. I.B.E.W. Local 1245 v. Pacific Gas & Electrical Co., 55 Lab. Arb. 459
(1970).
119. Supra note 110.
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labor arbitrators have found unreasonable the discharge of a truck driver
with sideburns exceeding the specified length by three-eighths of an
inch, 120 gas company servicemen with long sideburns and a gotee, 12 1 a
butcher with "mutton chop" sideburns, 22 and a truck loader with a
beard. 1 23 What distinguishes these two groups? The proximity of the
employee to the clients of the company is one obvious answer. A hair
regulation is less likely to be unreasonable for one in the front office of a
sales division, than it is for one working in an isolated area with little or
no contact with the public. Another factor is the nature of the employer's
business. Though it may be unreasonable to require short hair on a clothing salesman, a regulation banning long locks may be reasonable as applied
to a farm equipment salesman. Finally, it should be added that the labor
arbitrator's predilections as to human appearance play an apparent role
in determining the outcome of the employee's grievance.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

In addition to the contractual rights which all employees possess, public
employees are constitutionally protected against arbitrary or discriminatory discharge by their employer (a governmental agency).' 24 Is a violation of a dress code by a public employee a good (or an arbitrary) cause
for discharge? It first should be noted that the considerations relevant
to the firing of a private employee are not generally applicable to the public employee situation. A private corporation must uphold its good image
with the public, lest it suffer economic loss. Because a beard or long hair
on a male employee may impair the company's good will, a dress code
violation is good cause for discharge. On the other hand, a government
is not in business to make a profit, and in fact usually operates in the red.
Moreover, the customers (i.e., tapxayers) of the government cannot refuse
to deal with it merely because the tax collector is bearded; in any event
they are legally bound to pay their assessed taxes. Hence, a bearded
government worker can in no way effect the economic position of his employer, and for that reason the "good image" factor is inapplicable. If
a government's dress code is to be enforceable, another justification must
be found from among those thus far discussed-e.g., health, safety, disruption, decline of performance. Undoubtedly, there are some situations
120.

Supra note 108.

121.

Supra note 118.

122.
123.

Meat Cutters Local 612 v. Economy Super Mart, supra note 114.
Operating Engineers Local 66 v. Dravo-Boyle Co., supra note 111.

124. See, e.g., Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961)

and Wieman v. Upedgraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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where these factors may justify appearance regulations for government
workers. For example, safety considerations apply equally to machinists
with long hair, be they private or public employees. However, the vast
majority of government employees are of the "white collar" variety. What
purpose is served by a proscription against facial hair on teachers? On
probation officers? Firemen? Policemen?
The courts which have considered the problem of the public employee,
have found the government's dress code devoid of purpose, reason, or
substantial justification. Their approach closely resembles the approach
in the student dress code cases. For example, in Lucia v. Duggan,125 the
court held that the plaintiff, a bearded teacher, had been denied procedural
due process because there was no prior regulation banning beards. Similarly, in Ramsey v. Hopkins,12 6 a teacher with a mustache had been denied
due process and equal protection because the school's tacit dress code was
"based upon personal taste of an administrative official .... ,,127 Two
other courts have ruled that facial hair on black teachers is within the
peripheral protection of the first amendment. 128 The right of probation of1 29
ficers to display facial hair has also been upheld in recent decisions.
The more difficult challenges to government dress codes lie ahead in the
cases of policemen and firemen, whose function and regimentation is mili30
tary in nature.1
LAWYERS

Canon 1 of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional
Ethics provides: "It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts
a respectful attitude .

. . ."

Does this statement along with similar court

rules contain an implicit dress code for lawyers? Professor Pirsig believes
it does: "[A] judge may insist that a lawyer appearing before him be at125. 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969).
126. 320 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
127. Id. at 482.
128. The court in Braxton v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Duval County, Fla.,
303 F. Supp. 958, 959 (M.D. Fla. 1969) found that where the goatee of a black
teacher "is worn as 'an appropriate expression of his heritage, culture, and racial
pride as a black man' its wearer also enjoys the protection of first amendment rights,
at least the 'peripheral protection'....." Accord, Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
129. Fostner v. City and County of San Francisco, 243 Cal. App. 2d 625,
52 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1966) and Burlingame v. Milone, 62 Misc. 2d 853, 310 N.Y.S.2d
407 (1970).
130. See Elko v. McCarey, 315 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Penn. 1970) in which the
federal district court refused to rule on the dress code as applied to firemen, but
retained jurisdiction pending review by state administrative procedures.
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tired in keeping with the dignity of the proceedings."' 1 1 Indeed, the costumed tradition of the trial ritual with its judical robe and the wig and gown
required for British barristers underscores the strong connection between
courtroom etiquette and dress.
There is no question that judges have the inherent authority to maintain
order in the courtroom, and exclude from the presence of the court objects
that distract the jurors from the issues of the case. Does this empower a
judge to order an attorney to dress in an undistracting, conservative raiment? In People v. Rainey, 32 a California appellate court upheld the
right of the trial judge to order a female lawyer to remove her flamboyant
bonnet in the courtroom. However, a New York appellate court in Peck
v. Stone"13 reversed the order of a trial judge prohibiting a female attorney from appearing in court in a mini-skirt. Another California attorney
was recently fined for failing to wear a tie in court. 134 Does a "respectful attitude" require a male lawyer to wear a suit? Between appearance that is distracting to jurors and that which is simply distasteful to the
judge, the line is thin. The balance between the right of client to a fair
trial and the right of his lawyer to choose his dress is delicate. Must justice, which is blind, depend on one's outward appearance?
ORDINARY CITIZENS

Appearance regulations for ordinary citizens, though generally not palpable, exist neverthelss in a myriad of disguised forms. The discrimination
resulting therefrom may be less obvious, but it is every bit as real as the
sanctions imposed by the promulgated dress codes of students and employees. The continued harassment by police, for example, of persons of a
particular dress style (e.g., hippies) who frequent a certain park amounts
to a de facto park dress code."1 5 Likewise, if the police single out
131. PIRSIG, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 323 (1st ed. 1965).
132. 224 Cal. App. 2d 93, 36 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1964).
133. 32 A.D.2d 506, 304 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1969).
134. Chgo. Sun-Times, Oct. 18, 1970, at 6, col.4, in which is reported: "A
municipal court judge [in San Rafael, California] has fined a lawyer $100 and
refused him permission to defend a client for showing up in court without a necktie.
"Judge Alvin H. Goldstein, in court Thursday, told attorney Peter Pipe, 28, 'You
should show more respect for your profession and the court. . . .' Pipe was
dressed in blue jeans, tweed sports coat and sport shirt." (emphasis added)
135. See Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Penn. 1968) in which the
federal court refused to enjoin local police from arresting hippies congregating in a
certain park. See also Parr v. Municipal Court for the Monterey-Caramel Judicial
District of Monterey County, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1971), involving a trespass ordinance for city parks. The City Council of Caramel enacted the ordinance, expressly
intending to prevent hippies from congregating in its parks: "The City Council of
Caramel-by-the Sea has observed an extraordinary influx of undesirable and unsani-

250

[Vol. XX

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

bearded and long-haired travellers on a certain turnpike, and subject them
to unreasonable searches, is there not in fact highway appearance regulation? 13 6 Another illustration of a disguised dress code lies in requirements
for welfare benefits. If a person cannot obtain employment because of his
hair length, may the welfare administration require a haircut as a condition for the continued reciept of its funds?' 8 7 May a semi-public facility,
such as a shopping center or an amusement park exclude persons whose
appearance does not conform to the owner's wishes? 188 When may a
public or private interest legitimately authorize discrimination against a
particular style of dress? These are questions whose answers as yet lie
in the future.
CONCLUSION

Although the courts remain evenly divided and a single de jure trend on
the legality of student appearance regulations is not as yet perceptible, simple observation reveals a definite de facto trend in the student dress code
area. Many school districts have already succumbed to the pressure of
changing fashions,' 39 and have become more permissive in clothing and
hair style, either through more liberal dress codes, or perhaps by a failure to
enforce old regulatons. However, the real problem is far from solved.
The student dress code is but one manifestation of the conformity prejudice, only the top of the societal iceberg. Variations on the dress code
theme emerge in many obvious and disguised forms, and are inextricably
interwoven throughout the entire fabric of our culture-for students,
tary visitors to the City, sometimes known as 'hippies,' and finds that unless proper
regulations are adopted immediately the use and enjoyment of public property will
be jeopardized if not entirely eliminated. . . ." (excerpt from the ordinance) Id. at
154. The Supreme Court of California, in striking down the law, stated: "[W]e
can be no less concerned because the human beings currently in disfavor are identifiable by dress and attitudes rather than by color. . . . We hold [this ordinance] to
be in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
at 160.

136. See Lewis v. Kugler, Civil No. 1712-70 (D. N.J. 1971), a recently dismissed suit, petitioning a federal court to enjoin the New Jersey Police from harassing
long-haired travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike.

The case is currently on appeal

in the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, Civil No. 71-1227.
137. For a discussion of the problem, see Comment, Long Hair and the Judicial
Clippers: Can Welfare Officials Constitutionally Require Applicants to Trim Their

Locks to Enhance Their Employability?, 11

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

92 (1970); see

also Spangler v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 92 Cal. Rptr.
266 (1971) which deals with this issue.
138. For an analysis of this factual setting, see In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205,
90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992 (1970).
139. See SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM 337 (1970).
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teachers, policemen, public and private employees, military personnel,
prisoners, lawyers, ordinary citizens, ad infinitum.
It is not the purpose of this comment to suggest that all dress codes are
irrational exercises of authority. In many instances circumstances may
justify appearance sanctions. Sound safety practices may dictate that a
machinist have short hair. Good grooming and health may require a student to wash and comb his hair. Prisoner identification may necessitate
facial hair proscriptions for inmates of penal institutions. Military preparedness and combat efficiency may require a clean-shaven active duty
soldier so that a gas mask will fit properly. Economic considerations
may justify a company in forbidding an employee who deals closely with
the public from adopting bizarre clothing styles.
Too often, however, appearance regulations are discriminatory, unduly
broad, or simply unnecessary. Though Army appearance regulations
may be necessary for an active duty soldier, why a reservist? Surely,
he could shave on a minute's notice. Should "sanitariness" in a food factory justify a company hair regulation for an employee who works in the
mail room? Does safety necessitate short sideburns on a lathe operator?
Must a student conform because his appearance disrupts the student body?
The very height of irony is illustrated by a school in Great Britain, the
recently sent a student home
exporter of the "long hair" fashion, which
1 40
for not having enough hair on his head.
Deeply ingrained in our social character is the need to conform, and to
cause others to conform to arbitrary dress norms. This fact accounts for the
prevalence of dress codes in our culture, and for their arbitrariness in applicability and enforcement. It must be the law's function to separate the
rationalfrom the arbitraryin dress codes, to determine which appearance
regulations are substantially justified by legitimate governmental (or private) interests and which stem purely and simply from the irrational human conformity prejudice. In 1891 the Supreme Court said: 1 4 '
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraints or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.

Eighty years later these words apply with even greater force to the freedom of personal appearance.
James J. Carroll

140.
141.

Times Ed. Supp., June 6, 1970, at 10, col. 1.
Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).

